+[//]: # Changes proposed by Carl Hage, 1/18/2018
+[//]: # Split 
 #### 5.3.1. Key Decisions
 
 The following are some key decisions about requirements that need to be made
-at some point when designing and developing the voting system.
-
+at some point when designing and developing the voting system. Some pro and
+con tradeoffs are included.
 
-##### 5.3.1.1. Vote Centers
-
-California [SB 450][bill-sb-450-2015] ("Elections: vote by mail voting and
-mail ballot elections") authorizes counties to conduct elections using vote
-centers. The Department of Elections should develop a sense as soon as
-possible of the likelihood of using vote centers because that could affect
-the requirements and design of the system. Making this decision earlier could
-decrease costs since the design and development wouldn’t have to cover
-multiple scenarios.
+At this point, the intent here is to just present options with some
+discussion, not a particular recommendation.
 
+Assumptions
+-----------
 
-##### 5.3.1.2. Pre-printed versus on-demand ballots, including how selections a
re marked
+* Votes are cast (recorded, submitted, and stored) on paper in a human-readable
 form.
 
-For in-person voting, the question of pre-printed ballots versus on-demand
-ballots, combined with how ballots are marked (for both accessible voting and
-not-necessarily-accessible voting) will greatly affect what type of precinct
-hardware needs to be developed. It also greatly affects how many units would
-need to be purchased and deployed per precinct.
+* An electronic representation of ballots made either by voting machines or sca
nners serves only as a copy of the official paper ballot.
 
-This decision needs to be made separately for accessible voting and
-not-necessarily-accessible voting. However, the decisions for the two
-scenarios are not independent. They are related.
+* Ballots marked are on paper that meets the California regulations for printin
g (counterfeit resistance).
 
-For not-necessarily-accessible voting, options include—
+* By 2020, CA [AB973][bill-ab-973-2017] requires support of _Remote Accessible 
+Vote By Mail_ ballots ([AB2252][bill-ab-2252-2015]) for voters with disabilitie
s 
+or overseas and military voters. Home computers are used to print ballots on 
+ordinary paper, but returned via special mail envelopes. 
 
-1. Pre-printed ballots with selections marked by hand
+* Voting types to be considered:
+  + Vote by mail (preprinted and special accessible/overseas)
+  + Vote on election day at a polling location (precinct voting)
+  + Vote prior to election day at an early vote center
+  + Vote by people with disabilities requiring special equipment (ballot markin
g device)
 
-2. On-demand ballots printed without selections and marked by hand
 
-3. On-demand ballots printed together with selections using an accessible
-device
 
-For accessible voting, options include—
+##### 5.3.1.1. Will Vote Centers be used for early or election day voting?
 
-1. Pre-printed ballots marked using an accessible device (e.g. by inserting
-the ballot)
-
-2. On-demand ballots printed without selections and marked using an
-accessible device
-
-3. On-demand ballots printed together with selections using an accessible
-device
-
-Some considerations include—
-
-1. The more that the accessible and not-necessarily-accessible scenarios are
-similar to one another, the more consistent the voter experience will be. The
-most similar would be if both scenarios are conducted with option (3),
-“on-demand ballots printed together with selections using an accessible
-device.” Different but still similar would be if both groups use pre-printed
-ballots or on-demand ballots printed without selections, with the only
-difference being how the ballot is marked (by hand versus using an accessible
-device). The least similar would be, for example, option (1) for
-not-necessarily-accessible voting and option (3) for accessible voting. The
-latter happens to be how San Francisco conducts its elections today.
-
-2. To preserve ballot secrecy during the count, it is preferable if the voted
-ballots “look” the same across the accessible and not-necessarily-accessibl
e
-methods. An example of the ballots looking different would be if accessible
-voting results in voted ballots that contain only the voters’ selections and
-not other ballot choices, whereas the not-necessarily-accessible approach
-results in voted ballots containing all ballot choices but with the voters’
-selections marked.
-
-3. Requiring ballots to be printed on-demand for all voters (either with or
-without selections) would require using a printer for every voter in the
-polling place. This would likely require more electronic devices at each
-polling place, which in turn would increase costs, complexity, and the
-possibility of something breaking or going wrong. These printing requirements
-would be even greater for the case of printing not just blank ballots for all
-voters, but ballots with their selections for all voters. This is because
-voters would likely need to be occupying a machine while they are making
-their selections.
-
-4. Using pre-printed ballots allows voters without disabilities to vote using
-the “low-tech” solution of only using a marker or pen (with the exception o
f
-the precinct ballot scanner that normally scans and counts the ballot). This
-would reduce the polling place’s overall dependency on technology and
-possible things that can go wrong (e.g. power outages, one or more machines
-breaking, etc.).
-
-5. Using pre-printed ballots results in increased paper usage and printing
-costs, since the Department needs to prepare extras of every ballot type
-(including every language, party preference, and combination thereof).
-
-6. Printing ballots on-demand would theoretically allow voters to get the
-correct ballot type even if they go to the wrong precinct. Currently, a voter
-going to the wrong precinct can only choose among the ballot types
-pre-printed and made available at that precinct.
-
-7. If ballots are printed on-demand, poll workers would not have to keep
-track of all the different ballot types (e.g. different languages, the
-various party ballots, etc.). It would instead automatically be taken care of
-by the ballot printer.
-
-8. If the accessible device is a ballot-marking device, the device will be
-harder to use because each ballot card would need to be inserted individually
-into the device. Conversely, if the accessible device prints the ballot with
-selections, fewer physical cards would be required.
-
-
-##### 5.3.1.3. Printing unique identifiers on ballots at scan-time
-
-One key decision is whether a unique identifier should be printed on every
-ballot while it is being scanned.
+California [SB 450][bill-sb-450-2015] ("Elections: vote by mail voting and
+mail ballot elections") authorizes counties to conduct elections using vote
+centers. The Department of Elections should develop a sense as soon as
+possible of the likelihood of using vote centers because that could affect
+the requirements and design of the system. Making this decision earlier could
+decrease costs since the design and development wouldn’t have to cover
+multiple scenarios.
 
-Pros:
+While voters can be assigned to the traditional election-day precinct polling s
ite,
+with the right equipment, each poll site could have the full features of
+a vote center, i.e. allow voters from any precinct to vote at that site.
+
+Vote Centers could be used for:
+   1. Early voting only
+   2. Election day voting at selected locations
+   3. All election day polling locations
+
+##### 5.3.1.2. Should precinct polling and vote centers use the same paper ball
ots as vote by mail?
+
+  Background: If a voting machine is used to prepare ballots for printing, the 
+paper ballots marked could use the same printing and layout as a vote-by mail 
+ballot, or could have a simpler and shorter format listing just the contests an
d 
+selected choices (called _paper cast vote record_ in California Election Code).
 
+The shorter format could be on smaller paper, possibly only a single sheet, vs 
a 
+larger multipage scanned mail ballot. Voting machines (ballot marking devices) 
+could be used only by voters with disabilities, while most voters at a precinct
 
+or vote center uses a normal mail ballot, or all voters there could use voting 
+machines with printed ballots.
+
+  Mail-Only Format Pros:
+    * Only one style of ballot printing is required
+    * No need for precinct voters to use voting machines-- voters without
+      disabilities can use a "low-tech" solution of only a marker or pen
+    * Central storage and recounting has all the same ballot size/type
+    * Better ballot secrecy because all ballots look the same.
+    * Reduced requirements for printers and possible problems with printer malf
unction and paper jams.
+    * Mail ballot voting could be done with no electric power
+
+  Mail-Only Format Cons:
+    * Printing on large mail ballot paper, usually double sided requires 
+      special, possibly nonstandard, equipment. Sheets might need to be
+      hand-inserted individually.
+
+##### 5.3.1.2. Should hand-marked ballots be preprinted or printed on demand?
+
+  Background: If precinct voting is based on the low-tech paper ballot marked 
+with a pen, pads of preprinted paper ballots could be used. However, separate 
+pads are required for each ballot type, party preference and language preferenc
e 
+used at that precinct. A vote center might need to store ballots for all ballot
 
+types in the county, each in all languages. An alternative is to use blank 
+ballot card stock with a printer to create any desired ballot type and language
 
+preference, known as "ballot on demand" (BOD).
+
+  Ballot on Demand Pros:
+    * Reduced printing cost and paper use: no need to stock extra preprinted
+      ballots
+      in case all voters show up.
+    * Easier to accomodate multiple languages
+    * Allows any poll site to be a vote-center. Eliminates the problem of peopl
e
+      are at the wrong poll site casting provisional ballots with an incorrect
+      ballot type.
+
+  Ballot on Demand Cons:
+    * On site printers can fail and probably require AC power.
+    * Printing on large mail ballot paper, usually double sided requires specia
l, possibly nonstandard, equipment.
+
+##### 5.3.1.3. Should voting machines at a precinct or vote-center be used by a
ll voters or only voters with special needs?
+
+  Machines used by all non-mail voters Pros:
+    * Paper+Digital CVR has the highest security/integrity. Digital signatures 
can be printed on ballots to authenticate paper.
+    * Time to vote can be less than marking.
+    * Mistakes can be undone without needing another ballot to mark.
+    * Machines could read a QR code from a vote at home app to print a ballot i
mmediately.
+    * Precinct vote counts are available at the end of the day without having t
o scan ballots centrally or at a precinct. (But scanning a ballot ID is required
 upon depositing the paper ballot to distinguish
+    cast vs abandoned ballots.)
+    * A separate non-mail ballot format from voting machines would be the same 
for ordinary voters and those with special needs.
+    * Extra machines provide redundancy vs a single disability-access machine.
+    * Vote centers could handle all ballot types without the need for a ballot 
on demand system.
+    * Election-day machines could only allow authorized write-ins to be recorde
d, simplifying write-in voting and enabling end of day totals that include write
-ins.
+    * A full precinct scanner is not required-- just a simple bar code scanner
+      to track paper cast by entering into a ballot box. (The bar code is match
ed
+      against the electronic CVR.)
+
+  Machines used by all non-mail voters Cons:
+    * Requires more equipment, with increased cost, complexity, and the possibi
lity
+      of something going wrong.
+    * More possible problems with paper jams and printer malfunction.
+    * Voters need to be occupying a machine whole voting.
+    * Mail ballot processing is still a separate sizable operation.
+
+##### 5.3.1.4. If voters at precincts use mail ballots for marking, should ball
ots be scanned centrally or at the precinct/vote center?
+
+  Precinct ballot scanner Pros:
+    * Overvotes/Undervotes and invalid or ambiguous marks can be reported by th
e
+      scanner prior to submitting
+    * Precinct vote counts are available immediately at the end of the day
+    * Reduces the need for central scanning equipment
+
+  Precinct ballot scanner Cons:
+    * More equipment is required than central-only scanners
+    * If the scanner and ballot collection is integrated (the scanner feeds
+      into a ballot collection bin), custom equipment may be required.
+    * Not required if all ballots are printed by a voting machine
+
+##### 5.3.1.5. If a precinct scanner is used, does the scanner need to be integ
rated with a ballot collection bin?
+
+  Background: Custom-built precinct ballot scanners sold by election vendors 
+usually include a ballot collection bin within same box containing the scanner.
 
+The scanner feeds the ballot into the collection box, or else reverses the pape
r 
+feed in case of an error detected. An integrated device likely means custom 
+hardware vs COTS equipment.
+
+##### 5.3.1.6. If a precinct scanner is used (or central scanner), does it need
 to include an imprinter to record a ballot/scan ID?
+
+  Background: To match a specific paper ballot in a ballot box with a scanned 
+CVR, either the order of insertion must be maintained, or a unique identifier 
+associated with the scan needs to be added to the ballot. Alternatively, ordere
d 
+ballots could be rescanned centrally during a recount or audit and matched as a
 
+batch with the original scan.
+
+  Scanner Imprinter Pros:
 
 * This would permit more sophisticated auditing approaches that involve
   selecting individual ballots at random, which could reduce time and costs
@@ -606,14 +798,109 @@ Pros:
   done in larger “batches,” or ballots need to be kept in careful order to
   allow accessing individual ballots.
 
-Cons:
+  Scanner Imprinter Cons:
 
 * It is not clear if COTS scanners support the feature of printing while
-  scanning.
+  scanning. Available imprinters are expensive and might reduce scan speed.
 
 * The scanner hardware would become more complicated since there would be
-  another “moving part” that can break.
-
+  another “moving part” that can break, and may require consumables, e.g.
+  printer ink or ribbon changes.
+
+##### 5.3.1.7. If a voting machine is used to print ballots, does the ballot co
llection box need to have an integrated scanner?
+
+  Background: Using a voting machine with voter-verified ballot does not 
+constitute casting a ballot-- the act of submitting the ballot after 
+verification is the cast ballot. Voters might choose to discard a ballot and 
+revote, so a simple bar-code scanner is useful to match the electronic CVR with
 
+paper ballots submitted (i.e. exclude discarded ballots). Discarded ballots 
+could be scanned instead, but a voter could still walk off with a ballot, or a 
+ballot might not print correctly.
+
+##### 5.3.1.8. Is voting equipment required to run off a battery (without outsi
de AC power) for a set outage duration or all day?
+
+  No outside power Pros:
+    * Eliminates extension cords and possible special power requirements.
+    * Voting can continue in a power outage.
+    * Some equipment (tablets and laptops) have a built in battery that can wor
k during a power outage.
+
+  No outside power Cons:
+    * Limits the type of equipment used
+    * Might require special external batteries and power conversion
+
+##### 5.3.1.9. What kind of printing technology should be used at a poll site o
r vote center?
+    * Laser Printer (single/double sided)
+
+      Pros:
+        + High quality, durable printing
+        + Toner lasts for a large number of pages
+        + Fast printing
+
+      Cons:
+        + Requires AC power (limited life on backup power)
+        + Tracking/replacing toner cartridges is required
+
+    * Ink Jet
+
+      Pros:
+        + Low power
+        + Available as portable battery powered COTS
+
+      Cons:
+        + Ink cartridges drain quickly and dry out between elections
+        + Ink can smear before drying
+        + Head cleaning might be required
+
+    * Direct Thermal (on special paper)
+
+      Pros:
+        + Low power
+        + No consumables that need monitoring and reloading
+
+      Cons:
+        + Requires special paper
+        + Limited life - dissapearing ink
+        + Temperature sensitive
+        + Lower resolution
+
+    * Thermal Transfer (uses a ribbon)
+      Pros:
+        + Low power
+        + High quality printing
+
+      Cons:
+        + Ribbon usage needs to be tracked and replaced
+        + Not normally used for letter size printers
+
+##### 5.3.1.10. What size paper should be used for precinct voting and vote by 
mail?
+
+##### 5.3.1.11. What options should be provided to people with disabilities?
+    * Voting machines (BMD) at all precincts
+    * Voting machines at selected precincts or vote centers with transportation
 provided
+    * Vote by mail using home computer and printer
+
+##### 5.3.1.12. Should "remote accessible vote-by-mail" printing used by voters
 with disabilities to vote by mail using home computers also be used for disabil
ity-access precinct voting?
+
+  Background: California Election code specifies that remote accessible vote by
 
+mail capability should be provided by 2020 for people with disabilities and 
+military and overseas voters. Software to prepare these RAVBM ballots could in 
+principle be used at a precinct poll site or early vote center. Some states hav
e 
+used a similar system (e.g. Prime-III) for disability access voting at 
+precincts.
+
+##### 5.3.1.13. Does ballot collection order or CVR recordings need to be rando
mized to protect voter privacy (be disassociated by order of appearance at a pre
cinct)?
+
+  Background: To protect voter privacy, either the time and order of appearance
+  of a voter must not be recorded, or else the order of scanned or submitted
+  ballots must be randomized. Otherwise voter order and ballot order could
+  be correlated and secrecy compromized. If ballot box order must be randomized
,
+  then poll workers might need to shuffle ballots.
+
+  Scanned ballots imprinted with an ID could have sequential number assigned,
+  could simplify pulling ballots with a specific ID, e.g. for a ballot
+  requiring adjudication, or in an audit. Otherwise, a randomly assigned
+  unique ID could be imprinted, and stored electronic cast vote records
+  could have order randomized. 
 
 ##### 5.3.1.4. End-to-end verifiability