diff --git a/files b/files index 0027ed0..c8ba9e2 160000 --- a/files +++ b/files @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit 0027ed006735c566a08acc8e2e540db3e6d5b4ce +Subproject commit c8ba9e2807b988626a07873979bad2887bad4bb3 diff --git a/pages/recommendations.md b/pages/recommendations.md index b27eccd..776c18a 100644 --- a/pages/recommendations.md +++ b/pages/recommendations.md @@ -768,11 +768,22 @@ a ballot type code preprinted. When voters complete their selections, the paper is inserted into a printer, then they check the final printed ballot prior to casting into a ballot box. +The voting machine can compute a digital signature of the electronic cast +vote record, printed as a QR code on the paper ballot, proving that the +paper ballot was created by that machine on election day (or during early +voting) and results must match the signed CVR. The CVRs could be stored +by the machine creating them, and either used as an audit-trail, or used in +lieu of scanning the paper cast ballots. Election-day precinct totals could +be computed and printed from the voting machine CVRs as long as the IDs for +cast ballots are recorded. Machines used by all non-mail voters Pros: * Paper+Electronic CVR has the highest security/integrity. Digital signatures can be printed on ballots to authenticate paper. * Time to vote can be less than marking. * Mistakes can be undone without needing another ballot to mark. +* Eliminates errors like overvotes and ambiguous marks requiring adjudication. +* Ranked Choice contests can have rankings for all candidates, not just 3, +eliminating exhausted ballots. * Machines could read a QR code from a vote at home app to print a ballot immediately. * A separate non-mail ballot format from voting machines would be the same for ordinary voters and those with special needs. * Extra machines provide redundancy vs a single disability-access machine. @@ -872,10 +883,42 @@ paper ballots submitted (i.e. exclude discarded ballots). Discarded ballots could be scanned instead, but a voter could still walk off with a ballot, or a ballot might not print correctly. -Additional ballot box scanner Pros: [TODO] +(The LA County VSAP integrates the voting machine, printer, and ballot collection bin. The printer has a bar code scanner to read the ballot type on blank ballot paper and to re-read the ballot ID (to match with a CVR) as it enters the integrated ballot box.) -Additional ballot box scanner Cons: [TODO] +Even though an electronic CVR exists within the voting machine, it may still be +useful to have a full scanner at the precinct, so all CVRs are derived from +the scanned paper read by the voter, and scanned images are available immediately +at the end of election day. However, without a full precinct scanner, vote +totals would still be available at the end of the day, and a central scanner +could be used after the election for a 100% audit of paper ballots (paper CVRs). +If only machine-printed ballots are collected (no undervote/overvote/ambiguous +mark detection is required), then a simple plain COTS scanner could be used +to feed the ballot paper in the collection bin, only recording the ballot images. + +Additional ballot box scanner Pros: + +* CVRs are derived from the paper verified by voters, not an indirect stored CVR (one criticism of "Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail" is that the human-read paper record is typically not 100% checked) + +* Scanned ballot images can be recorded during the election and available +immediately afterwards. + +* Voting machines and scanners could use independent equipment and software, +increasing security. + +* Precinct scanners for casting voting-machine printed ballots could also be +used to scan vote-by-mail (hand-marked) ballots. + +* A precinct scanner could be used with text-to-speech to read back a ballot +for the visually impaired. + +Additional ballot box scanner Cons: + +* Additional equipment is required which is in theory, unnecessary. + +* A full scanner capable of error detection on hand-marked ballots might +require custom hardware (not COTS) for integration with a collection bin. +A simplified scanner that only can feed into the ballot box could be COTS. ##### 5.3.1.9. Is voting equipment required to run off a battery (without outside AC power) for a set outage duration or all day? @@ -891,7 +934,15 @@ No outside power Cons: ##### 5.3.1.10. What kind of printing technology should be used at a poll site or vote center? -Background: [TODO] +Background: There are many options for COTS and custom printers, including +several options for printing technology. Each option has different tradeoffs +in power requirements, consumables (ink, toner, etc.), an types of paper +supported. + +There is not necessarily a requirement that the printing technology be the +same across all locations. For example, a vote center might use a laser printer +for printing ballots on demand whereas a voting machine at a precinct might +use a thermal printer running off a battery. Options Include: @@ -974,9 +1025,17 @@ principle be used at a precinct poll site or early vote center. Some states have used a similar system (e.g. Prime-III) for disability access voting at precincts. -RAVBM used in precincts Pros: [TODO] +RAVBM used in precincts Pros: + +* Simplifies the software-- a single accessible voting software system is required both for accessible vote-by-mail and precinct voting. Likewise scanner software for reading RAVBM ballot paper would be reused for precinct voting. + +* An RAVBM system inherently must use COTS hardware, so only COTS hardware would be needed to implement accessible precinct voting. + +RAVBM used in precincts Cons: + +* The hardware and software used by RAVBM would probably not be considered as secure as smaller and more specialized software running on a secure microcomputer. -RAVBM used in precincts Cons: [TODO] +* RAVBM ballots probably need to use US letter size paper, so a different paper size might be required. (Although Prime-III as modified by NH could print on hand-marked ballot paper.) ##### 5.3.1.14. Does ballot collection order or CVR recordings need to be randomized to protect voter privacy (be disassociated by order of appearance at a precinct)?